Digital Collections @ Dordt
Faculty Work Comprehensive List
Spring 2018

Resisting the Devil’s Instruments: Early Modern Resistance Theory
for Late Modern Times
David Henreckson
Dordt College, david.henreckson@dordt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work
Part of the Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation
Henreckson, D. (2018). Resisting the Devil’s Instruments: Early Modern Resistance Theory for Late
Modern Times. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 38 (1), 43. Retrieved from
https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/1004

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Dordt. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Work Comprehensive List by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. For
more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Resisting the Devil’s Instruments: Early Modern Resistance Theory for Late
Modern Times
Abstract
In the midst of religious conflict in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a number of
prominent Protestant theologians and lawyers wrote on the collective moral obligation to resist systemic
injustice. My essay focuses on Johannes Althusius, who offers a theological account of the political community and its obligation to preserve the ·common good and resist injustice. Thinking alongside
Althusius, I will consider not only the conditions that may prompt acts of resistance but also the lawful
means and ends of resistance. In other words, how might resistance be carripd out rightly? By whom?
And to what end? Finally, I argue that we have good reasons to use Althusius's political thought to revive
an account of resistance that is internal to the Christian theological tradition-an account that relies on a
broader conception of divine justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability.

Keywords
Johannes Althusius, church and state, Reformed churches, common good, government

Disciplines
Christianity

This article is available at Digital Collections @ Dordt: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/1004

Resisting the Devil's Instruments:
Early Modem Resistance Theory for Late
Modem Times
David P. Henreckson

In the midst of religious conflict in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, a number of prominent Protestant �heologians and lawyers wrote on
the collective moral obligation to resist systemic injustice. My essay focuses
on Johannes Althusius, who offers a theological account of the political com
munity and its obligation to preserve the ·common good and resist injustice.
Thinking alongside Althusius, I will consider not only the conditions that may
prompt acts of resistance but also the lawful means and ends of resistance. In
other words, how might resistance be carripd out rightly? By whom? And to
what end? Finally, I argue that we have good reasons to use Althusius's politi
cal thought to revive an account of resistance that is internal to the Christian
theological tradition-an account that relies on a broader conception of divine
justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability.

THEGODOF THEEARLYMODERNREFORM EDTRADITIONH AS
sometimes been described as a Leviathan: all-powerful, unaccountable, and
utterly free in his dealings with humanity. His chief end is the increase of his
own glory. His covenants are made apart from any prior recognition of good
ness or merit, depending solely on his sovereign whim. The political theorist
Carl Schmitt, in one of his lesser-known works, went so far as to link the rise
of covenant theology in the Reformed tradition with the political absolutism of
Thomas Hobbes's famously controversial treatise Leviathan. According to
Schmitt-who is not alone in this judgment-what the early modern absolut
ists and the early modern Calvinists share is a commitment to the raw, absolute,
unqualified, and unchecked power of the sovereign, whether human or divine.
To put it in simple terms, the divine Leviathan of the Calvinists begat the hu
man Leviathan of the early modern nation-state.I
This narrative, in my judgm ent, is both too tidy and too provincial to be
true. I have addressed the historical inaccuracy of this interpretation elsewhere. 2
David Henreckson, PhD, is assistant professor of theology at Dordt College,
498 4th Ave. NE, Sioux Center, IA 51250; dhenreckson@dordt.edu.
Journalutthe Society ufChristian Ethics, 38, 1 (2018�: 43-57
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At present, my focus is more direct and limited. My first aim in this essay is
to show that there is a prominent strand of early Reformed thought that runs
directly contrary to the absolutist narrative we have received from Schmitt and
others. In fact, I argue that it is the early Reformed tradition, represented here
by the important but neglected figure ofJohannes Althusius, that gives us one of
the earliest examples of a radical, modern, and theological defense of collective
political resistance to unjust power.3
My second aim is to show how this early modem Protestant tradition offers
resources to analyze not only the conditions that prompt acts of resistance but
also the lawful means and ends of resistance. In other words, how might resistance be carried out rightly? By whom? And to what end?
My final aim is less historical and more constructive. Many recent works in
political theology and Christian ethics invoke the theme of resistance as central
to the work of social criticism. However, many of these accounts reflect the
disciplinary influence of recent social theory rather than theological ethics. As
a result, they sometimes lack the orienting normative concerns that have historically motivated Christian ethicists and moral theologians. I wish to use the
resources of Althusius,s political thought and this neglected radical strand of
the Protestant tradition to revive an account of resistance that is internal to the
Christian theological tradition—an account that relies on a broader conception
of divine justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability. Simply
put, Althusius and his contemporaries can offer us something that social theorists like Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler—for all their
insights—cannot: an account of radical politics that is both theologically rich
and historically grounded in the Protestant tradition.

The Problem of Resistance

In the Christian tradition, theological reflection on the possibility of political
resistance to injustice extends back at least to Thomas Aquinas and Augustine,
not to mention the ancient and late antique sources that informed their views.
Sketched in very broad terms, the premodern theological tradition acknowledged that all political authority derives from God, following Paul’s argument
in the locus classicus of Romans 13. “Political powers do not bear the sword
for no reason,” and Christian subjects have a divine mandate to obey them. At
the same time, premodern theologians were fully aware of exceptional cases.
Tyrants, demagogues, and oligarchs are not a modern invention, of course.
What should Christians do when confronted by tyrants and their perverted
systems of governance? Premodern theologians argued that, while political
subjects are generally obligated to obey the command of a political superior
as if it came from God, the command is morally binding only if it is just and
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lawful. A magistrate’s command to commit theft, murder, or any other act
prohibited by the moral law must not be obeyed. In this sense, what I will call a
passive or indirect form of resistance would be considered legitimate. Aquinas
even goes so far as to suggest the legitimacy of some sort of political resistance
to tyranny: “A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not
to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler. . . . Consequently,
there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind.”4 Aquinas does
not, however, provide an account of the mechanism for popular resistance, nor
does he articulate a doctrine of popular sovereignty that would support such a
collective undertaking.5
If we look ahead to the first and second generation of Protestant reformers, we can find this account (which I am generically calling the premodern
view) well represented among the leading Protestant theologians. For instance,
like Aquinas and other premodems, John Calvin allows that Christians might
resist an unjust authority through indirect means. They might call on lesser
magistrates to intervene on their behalf. They might repent of whatever sin
prompted God to judge them with the scourge of tyranny in the first place.
They might flee the country (this was of course a common occurrence during
the religious wars of the sixteenth century). Or they might simply choose not
to obey the unjust command and prepare themselves for the consequences.
Still, Calvin thinks the subject may not actively, or direcdy, resist the office of
civil mle itself. To resist directly, by force of arms, would be to upset the whole
order of divine-human governance. This sort of action would be an impiety
that welcomes chaos.6
According to Calvin and the premodern tradition, therefore, a Christian
subject might choose not to obey an unjust command, and she might choose
not to participate in an unjust political system, but she would have no means
to chasten or contest the system itself. This sort of resistance to structural sins
and injustice is prohibited. The sword belongs to the divinely appointed human
sovereign, who alone is the agent of divine wrath and justice.

An Early Modern Solution to the Problem of Resistance

By the turn of the seventeenth century, many Reformed thinkers had become
discontent with a merely indirect doctrine of resistance. The reasons for this
shift are many, but one of the most important turning points was the massacre
of thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of French Protestants in the weeks
following St. Bartholomew’s Day in 1572. Suspicions ran deep that members
of the French royal family were involved in plotting the horrific event. The
historians Harro Höpfl and Martyn Thompson mark the massacre as the pivotal moment that forced early Protestant political thinkers to develop a more
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comprehensive doctrine of resistance centered on the theological concepts of
covenant and contract.7 Prior to the massacre, leading Protestants had hoped to
persuade the French royal family to embrace a policy of toleration. Theodore
Beza, Calvin’s successor in Geneva, appeared repeatedly before the French
court over many years, pleading the Huguenot cause in the face of what he saw
as unjust persecution: “Sire, it belongs to the Church of God, in whose name
I speak, to endure blows and not to inflict them. But it will also please your
Majesty to remember that she is an anvil that has worn out many hammers.”8
Beza’s metaphor has an ominous subdety about it, but even this threat of divine
vengeance rang hollow in the aftermath of the massacre. An indirect doctrine
of resistance no longer sufficed. As Höpfl puts it, the massacre in 1572 “effectively meant the end of the project for an evangelical conversion of the whole
of France: the issue now was survival.”9
Reformed thinkers such as Beza, and later Althusius, began asking whether
there might be certain unjust actions that a political ruler could commit that
would not only negate any moral obligations to obey her command but also—if
sufficiendy unjust or impious—divest her of office. And if there were such acts,
how would we recognize them?
Beza attempted to answer these questions in his treatise On the Right ofMagistrates, written soon after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. Following the premodem tradition before him, Beza claimed that whenever a political ruler issues
an immoral command, one that directs his subjects to commit injustice or impiety, the command lacks binding force. Up to this point, we have not progressed
any further than Aquinas, Calvin, and the preceding theological tradition.
However, Beza then goes on to criticize absolutist theorists—that is, proponents of arbitrary and absolute power—arguing that they “so far exalt the
authority of kings and supreme rulers as to dare maintain that they have no
other judge but God alone to whom they have to render account {rationem reddere) of their deeds.”10 In other words, the absolutists acknowledge that princes
may sin and perpetrate injustice in the political community, but they assume
that only God has the authority and agency to chasten and correct an unbridled
magistrate. The people may pray for divine help. They may call on other political powers to intervene. But that is all. Beza, however, is not content to leave
it at this. In fact, he thinks that the idea that an unjust magistrate is answerable
only to God is utter folly and impiety. So he asks his readers: “Is there no other
remedy for injustice?”11
Both Beza and Althusius believe that other remedies do exist, and that these
remedies may be not merely permissible but even at times obligatory. Beza
answers his own question directly: “I deny that ... it [is] illicit for a people
oppressed by obvious tyranny to protect themselves from their enemy by just
remedies, in addition to prayer and penitence.”12 What these just remedies
are, beyond seeking the help of other civil or foreign magistrates, is not always
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clear. What is significant, though, is the fact that Beza reclassifies the unjust
magistrate as the “enemy” of the oppressed people. By retitling the person who
formerly held the office of “prince” as an “enemy,” Beza has found a way around
the received interpretation of Romans 13 and other scriptural texts that require
Christians to obey political authorities. Christian subjects should of course obey
their princes and kings, Beza argues, but why should they be expected to obey
their enemies?
Beza does not provide much detail about how to identify the moment at
which a legitimate prince becomes a tyrannical adversary. However, if we now
turn to Johannes Althusius, we can find a thoroughly theological answer to
Beza’s question. First, however, recall the precise terms of Beza’s criticism of
his absolutist rivals. Proponents of absolute power argued that earthly princes
were accountable only to God. No matter how heinous the offense, only the
divine sovereign may call earthly rulers to account. Beza suggests that this is a
false, perhaps even impious, doctrine; however, he does not offer an extensive
alternative account. Althusius does.
In his most influential work, a treatise titled Política Methodice Digesta, Althusius picks up the thread of Beza’s argument.13 When the absolutists claim
that earthly princes are accountable only to God, Althusius argues, they offer us a false hierarchy of political relations. According to the absolutists, the
prince owes obedience to God, as do the people, but both parties are “debtors
to God alone.” In other words, there is no covenantal accountability horizontally, between earthly rulers and the people—only vertically, between the divine
sovereign and the earthly ruler.14
According to Althusius, who follows Beza in this regard, this is an unjust
and even impious political doctrine. Drawing on his own Reformed theological
tradition, Althusius argues that God enters into a mutual covenant with both
the prince and the people. All are unified in the same covenantal fellowship;
therefore, within the terms of this fellowship, the prince and the people are also
obligated to render justice to each other and to God for the sake of the common
good. In other words, the people have at least as much of a stake in the political
covenant as the prince. The people, alongside the prince, are codebtors before
God, responsible for pursuing justice in the political community.15
But exacdy how might the political community go about identifying what this
justice looks like? What is the standard for right relations between the political ruler and his subjects? Althusius’s initial answer is deeply theological and
also runs quite to the contrary of the stereotyped picture of the Calvinist God
offered by Schmitt and others. He argues, if we want to distinguish just from
unjust political relationships, we must look to the paradigmatic relationship
between the divine sovereign and his creatures. God is the perfecdy good lawgiver who issues directives for the well-being—or salvation—of his people. The
terms of this relationship find their rationale in the faithful love of the sovereign
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for his people and their fulfillment, first, in the people’s recognition of God’s
goodness and, second, in their reciprocating love for God and neighbor. God
would not, and in fact could not, be unfaithful or unjust to his beloved people.
Althusius applies this point to the political order by means of an a fortiori argument: if even God, who is all-powerful, cannot sin by acting against what is just
in relation to his creatures, how much more is the earthly ruler bound to this
standard?16 No just power can be absolute. No good power can be arbitrary.
What happens then if a prince acts unjustly, breaks covenant, and the prayers
and patience of the people go unanswered? What happens when power-hungry
popes, priests, oligarchs, and magistrates arbitrarily dominate their subjects,
destroying the proper goods and fellowship that individuals ought to be able
to enjoy together? The conditions are such that the social bonds that ought to
provide for the mutual enjoyment and communication of goods no longer exist.
Althusius, like Beza, names this condition as tyranny.
Here, at last, we arrive at Althusius’s primary innovation, the point at which he
is willing to go beyond what I have termed the doctrine of indirect resistance that
had long been part of the premodern theological tradition. In effect, Althusius
identifies the people themselves—and not their rulers and magistrates—as the
principal human party of the covenant, the party who bears the primary responsibility for preserving right order. As a collective, covenanted body, the people
have authority—given to them by God himself—to hold tyrannical princes to
account. They may hold an unjust ruler responsible, name his sins publicly, call
for repentance, and even authorize public “vindicators” to mount an armed resistance to an “incurable” tyrant. According to these terms, magistrates and rulers
are merely administrators or stewards of the political community and its common
goods. And as administrators, they may be deposed as the people see fit.
This new conception of popular political agency carries with it a rather
strenuous moral obligation: we are all mutually bound to seek the common
good and to challenge those figures or institutions that break covenant and
twist our shared forms of fife toward unjust ends. In fact, Althusius claims, the
people—as codebtor before God—are “held responsible for the fault” of the
prince and “[share] his sins” if they do not hold the covenant-breaker accountable and “resist and impede him” so far as possible. God, the initiating party to
the covenant, stands as vindicator: “He will cast Israel down because of the sins
of Jeroboam.”17

How to Recognize Tyranny

It is one thing to claim that it is legitimate for the people to resist an unjust
ruler. It is another matter to have the practical wisdom to identify a tyrannical
ruler and the forms of systemic injustice that give rise to such a figure. I noted in
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the previous section that Beza, Althusius, and others made a normative distinction between a true ruler and a tyrant.18 Resistance is prohibited in the former
case but permitted—potentially—in the latter.
For Althusius, as we have already seen in some detail, tyranny is defined
as the contrary of just and morally upright political rule. In other words, it
is the privation of good rule: “Through tyranny, the foundations and bonds
{vincula) of the covenantal fellowship are bbstinately, persistently, and incurably destroyed and overthrown, against the ruler’s pledged faith and professed
oath.”19 Althusius, like earlier proponents of resistance, denies that a ruler who
perpetrates these tyrannical conditions is the sort of ruler that Paul has in mind
in the epistle to the Romans. A tyrant is not a minister of God but is better
described as an instrument of the devil {sed diaboli instrumentant dicitur).20 What
is owed to this sort of ruler?
For Althusius, this is not just a rhetorical question, and his answer is not
as straightforward as we might have expected. We might expect Althusius to
authorize any and all acts of resistance to someone he describes as diabolical.
Or perhaps we might assume that the existence of tyranny puts an end to preexisting social commitments and moral norms, essentially authorizing popular
revolution. But Althusius’s answer is more complex.
In an appendix to the Política, added in the second edition in 1610, Althusius
analyzes the various species of tyrannical rule so that his readers can better
identify the right response in particular cases. Tyrants may be instruments of
the devil, but not all diabolical agents are the same, nor should they be resisted
each in the same way. Here Althusius reminds his readers that not all failures
or imperfections of rule are tantamount to tyranny—or, to be more precise,
tyranny in its absolute or paradigmatic sense. In less extreme cases, Althusius
cautions, virtuous citizens should not act rashly. Some rulers may be unjust in
one aspect of their office but not others. Some rulers may suffer from a failure
of will in performing their duties. And others may have started down a tyrannical path but may still be turned away from their destination by wise counselors.
Many individual sins and imperfections can and should be tolerated in order
to preserve political fellowship. Althusius draws an analogy between political
and marital covenantal relationships: the individual sins of a magistrate do not
necessarily abrogate his authority in se, “just as a marriage is not dissolved by
every misdeed committed by one spouse against another, except for adultery,
since this is directly contrary to the nature” of the fellowship.21
To determine the right responses to political injustice, therefore, we have
to consider tyranny in its various forms. Borrowing from earlier Protestant and
medieval sources, Althusius distinguishes between “fundamental” and “administrative” tyranny. The former concerns the foundational laws, religious oaths,
and social bonds that make the community a cohesive political body.22 We
might describe this as constitutional tyranny, or tyranny in extremis, in which
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the tyrant breaks the oath she made to the political community—and to God—
thereby destroying the social order and impeding the relevant public figures
from the performance of their duties.23 If a ruler were to commit treason, for
instance, or plot against her own people, such actions would violate the very
foundation of the political order.
The second form of tyranny concerns the unjust or impious administration
of the community’s goods. It is much more common and takes more complicated forms than the first. In this species of tyranny, the ruler is still technically
fulfilling his office, serving as administrator of the goods of society, but doing
so in a perverse way—at the expense of his people. The improper administration of goods might be general in nature, as in the exercise of absolute power,
or more specific. Althusius here provides a catalog of vices and behaviors that
characterize this latter form of administrative tyranny. This catalog provides
examples to help his readers recognize injustice when it is cloaked under some
other description. Among other things, the tyrant is one who corrupts social
practices, luxuriates in material comforts at public cost, permits crimes to go
unpunished, and nourishes factions and wars to weaken the collective strength
of his subjects.24 If this list sounds familiar to us today, Althusius would not be
surprised: tyranny is a perennial condition that encroaches wherever a community has become vicious or unvigilant.

Identifying Tyranny's Remedies

Besides articulating the distinction between a true ruler and a tyrant, Althusius
and others made a second breakthrough in early modern political thought: a
new conception of popular political agency, supported by a theological account
of divine power and goodness. The political community, as a whole, is authorized by God to hold the ruler to account. It may recognize certain persons,
whether individual magistrates or an authorized assembly, as “public” figures
with the authority to resist the unjust actions of a tyrant.
At the beginning of this essay, I noted that the premodern theological tradition had the resources to distinguish between just rule and tyrannical rule,
even allowing that it may be permissible for someone—it is not entirely clear
who—to contest the latter. However, the premodem theological tradition did
not offer an explicit account of how legitimate acts of resistance might be carried out, nor did it have a doctrine of popular political agency—as Althusius
does—which would authorize the political community to engage in these acts.
While I have argued that Althusius and many of his Protestant peers did
make political and theological advances on these points, we still need to consider
the mechanisms for resistance. In other words, how might a people go about
resisting a tyrant and various forms of structural injustice? More precisely, how
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might a people resist tyranny in a just and righteous manner so they do not fall
prey to the temptations of absolute and arbitrary power?
Early modern theologians like Althusius and Beza were fully conscious of
the temptations that often accompany acts of social and political resistance.
The tyrant is an existential threat to the political community, but some acts of
resistance may themselves threaten to undermine the common good of fellowship if carried out imprudently, rashly, or maliciously. Oftentimes it is better to
endure unjust conditions in patient hope that acts of forbearance, rather than
resistance, may better serve the common good of the community. If we resist
wrongly, social trust breaks down, and the fellowship we hoped to preserve may
instead wither away through our rashness.25
With these temptations in mind, it is important to consider the practicalities
of resistance—a moral task that the early modern Protestants took quite seriously. This involves considering a series of practical, prudential questions of the
following sort: Is this the right time or place to resist? What sort of resistance is
called for? Will an act of resistance result in greater injustice than the present
circumstances? What previous commitments and promises are relevant? To
resist lawfully, we must be ready to make judgments on these matters.
Here is it crucial to emphasize that, for Althusius and even the most radical
of his Reformed contemporaries, acts of resistance do not occur in anything like
a Schmittian state of exception. Preexisting moral norms are not suspended,
nor are the principles, institutions, and communal bonds that made the political community something valuable in the first place. That is to say, acts of
resistance are not acts of revolution but rather restoration. In fact, as I argue in
the next section, acts of resistance may be judged as legitimate, in part, insofar
as they aim at protecting the common good of fellowship in the community.
How, then, should we go about identifying the proper criteria of lawful
resistance to various species of tyranny? To make these sorts of judgments,
Althusius directs us toward a traditional form of moral inquiry: the criteria
of lawful resistance are the who, what, where, when, and why of the action.26
When considering the legitimacy of political resistance, as in traditional accounts of just war theory, each of these considerations bears on the rightness
of the undertaking.
First, the who: there must be an authorized representative of the political
community. Althusius, following Calvin and others, refers to this officer as an
ephor, a lesser magistrate, or some authorized public agent. This public agent
is someone who bears responsibility for resistance to injustice and to whom
the people ought to join themselves, adding their own strength, resources, and
counsel.27 Here it is crucial to note that when Althusius restricts acts of resistance to this class of public agents, he is not explicitly identifying a particular
legal or political office. He is referring, rather, to a general species of public
office that holds the supreme ruler to account for his or her actions. This
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species of public office may occupy a different place in the social hierarchy
across different constitutional systems.28 In other words, the people may look
to any number of public figures—a prince, a duke, a city elder, or any audiorized assembly of the people—for vindication. The democratic implications
of this last option may be more obvious to us than it was to Althusius, but it
is worth underscoring.
Second, and immediately related to the first point, the what and where: jurisdiction matters when determining the right course of action. “What is to be
done collectively by the public agents,” Althusius argues, is best done through
a deliberative process of mutual consent between the people and its authorized
administrators. Deliberation must be careful, patient, and arrive at some sort
of practical consensus. In other words, public figures must take care not to
overstep their own authority and prosecute a tyrant in ways that go beyond
their administrative purview or are disagreeable to the community’s representatives.29 In straightforward terms, this means that public administrators must
not act “beyond the boundaries” of the scope or scale of their office. At the
same time, Althusius’s comments about jurisdiction reflect his belief that authoritative public action must arise from within the community. Correction and
resistance are internal matters.
Third, the when: as the people go about identifying the right occasion to
resist, and what measure of force should back up the act of resistance, several
things must be considered. How serious and inflexible is the tyranny? Have all
other remedies been exhausted? And how have the injustices of the tyrannical
ruler been made public to the political community? On this final point, Althusius indicates that three forms of public recognition are central: recognition of
tyranny’s existence, its extent, and the means by which the tyrant has previously
been challenged. This last point is crucial for Althusius since there must be a
record of admonishment and public correction prior to any formal act of foreible resistance. If these conditions are satisfied, as I detailed earlier, the unjust
ruler must be held to account. Ideally, the public agents will call an assembly,
but if they fail to do so, Althusius grants that “public avengers and deliverers
should be constituted ad hoc by the people itself.”
Finally, the why: the rationale for lawful resistance is the restoration of fellowship. Althusius writes that a tyrant must be resisted so long as the unjust
conditions endure, whether in words, deed, or dissembling, and so long as “he
acts contrary to the declared covenant.” On these terms, lawful acts of resistance must continue “until the republic is returned to its original condition.”30
The remedy of resistance aims at the restoration of health to the political body
and perseveres until this end is accomplished. In other words, the people, having diagnosed the disease that plagues the body, may prescribe the appropriate
remedy—even if that means deposing a tyrant, or calling for forcible resistance
to unjust power.
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Early Modern Resistance and Late Modern Problems

What does this mean for contemporary theological ethics? Are there reasons to
view these early modem ideas as something more than just historical relics? Is
there still life in these traditional, white, European, Calvinist bones?
I want to draw out two practical, and I think increasingly relevant, implications of early Reformed resistance theory for contemporary Christian ethics. The first implication concerns covenantal responsibility and arises out of
Althusius’s doctrine of mutual accountability. As I argued earlier, if we read
Althusius carefully, we will encounter a strenuous moral exhortation: individuals cannot stand idly by when they witness systemic injustice in the church or
political society. This may seem a trite moral maxim, easily endorsed by any
right-thinking citizen. But I believe that Althusius’s point mns deeper than
this. He means to implicate us in the deepest, most complicated sins of our
communities—simply by virtue of our membership in these communities. In
effect, he tells us, insofar as you take yourself to be—and are recognized as—a
member of a particular community, you bear a covenantal responsibility for its
goods and ills, its virtues and vices, its justice and injustice. By participating in
the life of whatever community you belong to (by choice or by birth), you are
under a relentless obligation to seek its good and to ensure that other members
of the community are able to do likewise.
We often fail to fulfill this obligation, and in multiple ways. It may be relatively easy to identify the occasions in which we fall short by actively committing injustice against a neighbor. It is more difficult, but no less important,
to identify the occasions in which we sin not only by commission but also by
omission: “by remaining silent, defaulting, dissembling, permitting, or enduring” the sins and crimes of an unjust ruler or institution. Again, he stresses, the
obligation to resist injustice and to set things right obtains to the community
as a whole. Factions or parties within the political community cannot simply
shirk responsibility or shift blame to their rivals; all are codebtors before God.
If anyone stands by while Jeroboam worships idols and slaughters the innocent,
they partake in his sin—and his judgment. If we are truly going to claim popular
political agency, we must also have a keen sense of our personal and collective
responsibility for the shared life of the political community.
If Althusius is right about this, there are two related issues that must be addressed. First, acts of resistance must be regarded as internal to the community
itself. In other words, resistance arises from within the community, for the sake
of the community. Such acts may be regarded as righteous and just only if they
are duly authorized, and this authorization comes from the political community
that God has called into being. If someone claims to be a liberator but does
not derive her authority from the community or make herself accountable to
the community, she lacks the authority to act justly on its behalf. The second
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related issue regards complicated questions about self-identity, mutual recognition, and the status of liminal persons who may not be fully recognized—or
valued—by the communities they find themselves in. Whose voice counts in the
community? I raise this issue here not to solve it once and for all but rather to
suggest that Althusius’s discussion of broad-based political agency may be more
democratic than he would have cared to admit. If everyone has a responsibility
to care for the common good and to ensure that every other member of the
community is also able to participate in this fellowship, then the boundaries of
inclusion may be more expansive and more porous than Althusius himself may
have realized. It is possible to see glimmers of this possibility in some surprising niches of Althusius’s writings.31 The work that remains for contemporary
Christian ethicists is to make explicit what was only implicit in the best parts of
this strand of early modern thought. Protestant political thought is not a closed
canon, and the heirs of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Beza, and Althusius should
feel authorized to direct the tradition toward new places and to address questions that would not have occurred to their theological forebears.
There is a second implication of early modern resistance theory, which
builds on the first. If the demanding responsibilities of political life are to be
carried out faithfully, members of the community will need to find ways to
cultivate a set of discrete political virtues to sustain these efforts. Early moderns like Althusius paid a great deal of attention to the virtues that must be
in evidence among a people and its rulers if a republic is going to survive, let
alone flourish. These virtues, Althusius argues, must be cultivated in homes,
congregations, civic communities, and workplaces before they can do the work
on a larger political or electoral stage. While it may seem quixotic to campaign
on an exhortation to virtue—for good reason these days—I think Althusius is
correct. Perhaps ironically, it is on this point that Althusius falls back on the
wisdom of the ancients and the medievals: a rightly ordered republic, one in
which all members are able to pursue the common good, needs virtuous citizens
and exemplars. And what are some of these virtues? They include the prudence
to recognize the difference between justice and injustice, the tolerance to live
well with those we find objectionable, the piety to honor the people, institutions, and traditions that made us who we are, and the courage to sacrifice for
the sake of fellowship and call tyrants to account.
It is also important to account for the flipside of this matter: all too often acts
of resistance are undertaken by the vicious or those ill-equipped to rightly order
the means and ends of these acts. Those lacking in prudence will misjudge their
circumstances or the conditions needed for successful resistance. Those lacking
the virtue of tolerance will not be prepared to respond appropriately to those
actions or people they find objectionable. Those lacking in piety may become
demagogues. Those lacking in courage will habitually conform to the demands
of individuals or institutions that exercise undue economic power or social

David P. Henreckson

·

55

pressure. In many of these cases, vicious agents of resistance and their fellow
social critics might turn out to be a remedy more pernicious than the disease.
If we are to recover this early modern doctrine of resistance for contemporary purposes, we need to take note of Althusius’s anxiety about the ways that
resistance can go wrong. But at the same time, it is important to remember that
righteous acts of resistance can often be identified by examining their primary
ends and means. Do acts of resistance aim to preserve or restore the fellowship of the community? Or do they instead aim to shore up private goods and
partisan interests? Are acts of resistance being carried out virtuously by representative individuals who act with prudence, courage, and charity? Or are they
being carried out carelessly, rashly, and with ill intent?
These questions are not easily answered. And in a political context like our
own, consensus answers will be even harder to come by. I find this reality
regrettable—perhaps even cause for lament—but not paralyzing or sufficient
grounds for resentment. The temptation to despair or to resort to some form of
apocalyptic impatience may seem quite strong to us now. But insofar as politdcal fellowship is still recognized as valuable, whether by our fellow citizens or
by God, we have cause to hope. So long as there are those who devote themselves to cultivating the virtues needed to live well with each other, to pursue
just relations despite the personal cost, there is reason to continue to look for
restoration.
If we want to repurpose an early modem doctrine of resistance for our own
late modem troubles, this is where we must start: doing the hard, slow work of
moral formation, correction, and confrontation. The work of virtuous, rightly
ordered resistance could begin on the smallest of scales: in homes, classrooms,
congregations, or similar civic communities. Perhaps from those seedbeds we
will see the outgrowth of something more expansive. However, regardless of
the context, we can hope to see the public work of resistance being carried out
by virtuous citizens who recognize themselves as codebtors before God and
neighbor for the common good of fellowship with each other. This invaluable
good is something worthy of our attention, our struggle, and our sacrifice.
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